|
Statement by Mr AS Minty, the South
African Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna
Agenda item 8 (c)
Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement of the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Report by
the Director General
Chairperson,
We wish to associate ourselves with the statements
made on behalf of the African Group and the NAM on this
agenda item.
My delegation wishes to thank the Director General
for his report on recent developments regarding the
implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement of the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as contained
in document GOV/2004/59.
Member States will recall that the 2000 NPT Review
Conference reconfirmed the IAEA as the competent authority
for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements.
My delegation has thus repeatedly expressed the view,
including at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the
NPT, that States need to ensure that the Agency is able
to verify that their nuclear capabilities are used for
peaceful purposes only.
In this regard, we have noted with satisfaction that
Libya has shown good co-operation with the Agency since
the beginning of the verification activities following
its declaration in December 2003, which has enabled
the Agency to gain an understanding of Libya's previously
undeclared nuclear programme.
We wish to commend Libya for providing the Agency with
prompt access to locations and taking corrective actions
to come into compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.
At the same time, South Africa has also noted that some
areas related to the acquisition of UF6, uranium conversion
technology and enrichment technology require further
investigation in order to fully verify the completeness
and correctness of Libya's declarations.
The Director General's report has also made it clear
that in order for the Agency to complete its verification
of Libya's past undeclared nuclear programme, the co-operation
of other Member States remains essential. Of particular
importance in this regard is the role of the clandestine
supply network that supported this programme and the
sources of contamination of some enrichment related
equipment by low and high enriched uranium particles.
My delegation would like to encourage Libya and all
other relevant Member States to continue their active
co-operation with the Agency to ensure that these matters
are resolved as soon as possible.
Chairperson,
The South African Government shares the international
community's concern over the illicit transfer of nuclear
and nuclear related dual-use technology and materials
that could be used in weapons of mass destruction and
encourages the sharing of information that would identify
individuals or entities involved in such illicit activities
with a view to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit
trade.
In this regard, and in terms of the South Africa's
strict policy of disarmament and non-proliferation with
regard to weapons of mass destruction and the capabilities
to produce these weapons, an investigation has over
several months been undertaken with regard to contravention
of South Africa's Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993) and Nuclear
Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999).
These investigations by the South African authorities
have been undertaken in co-operation with other countries,
as well as with the IAEA. The investigations have also
taken place in the context of the so-called Khan network,
as well as the information obtained following Libya's
announcement of the abandonment of its nuclear weapons
programme.
The allegations being investigated relate to the import
and export of a controlled flow- forming lathe, as well
as the production and possession of certain components
associated with a centrifuge enrichment plant without
the necessary permits. It is alleged that these activities
were intended to assist in Libya's now abandoned nuclear
weapons programme.
Acting upon information obtained during the course
of the investigation into the activities of some companies
and individuals who may have been involved in the alleged
contravention of the relevant South African legislation,
a number of individuals have been arrested. These individuals
were charged with contravening the Non-Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and the Nuclear Energy
Act by importing, exporting, possessing and producing
certain controlled items without the necessary permits
or authorisation.
Several facilities were searched by members of the
Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions,
the South African Police Services (SAPS) and inspectors,
as well as other technical advisors appointed in terms
of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act.
During the course of these searches, 11 shipping containers
were found at one company containing components of a
centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, as well as related
documentation. I can report that the 11 containers were
sealed by the South African Police Services and transported
to a secure site at Pelindaba. At South Africa's request,
the containers have also been sealed by the IAEA. The
Agency, together with the SAPS will maintain control
over the equipment.
The investigation has reached a sensitive stage and
is still ongoing. Further details regarding the outcome
of our continuing investigations will be reported to
the Agency and relevant governments in due course.
Chairperson,
As we have stated at previous Board meetings, South
Africa strongly supports the tightening of controls
over nuclear material, technologies and equipment to
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking.
At the same time, we wish to emphasise the critical
importance of effective information-sharing and co-operation
among all relevant parties and the central importance
of the IAEA. No control regime, no matter how comprehensive
and impenetrable, can fully guarantee against abuse.
The success of such measures remains highly dependent
on the trust, goodwill and level of co-operation between
countries. In this regard, my delegation would like
to thank the Agency and especially the Director General
and the Secretariat and all other governments involved
for their continuing co-operation and support. Without
their assistance and co-operation, we would not have
been able to make such rapid progress.
Chairperson,
I thought that I should share this preliminary information
with the Board of Governors before I meet with the media
tomorrow.
We wish to thank the Director General and his staff
for keeping this Board informed of developments related
to the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It
is our view that this item should be removed from the
agenda of the next Board of Governors Meeting and be
dealt with in a normal manner in accordance with Libya's
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.
I thank you.
Issued by Department of Foreign Affairs
Private Bag X152
Pretoria
0001
15 September 2004
|
