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Statement by Ambassador Kumalo of South
Africa to the Security Council on Non-Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 22 April 2004
Mr. President,
South Africa welcomes this open debate and the fact
that the Security Council is discussing the non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, particularly
as it relates to non-State actors. We requested this
debate together with the delegations of Canada, Mexico,
New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland because it is our
view that this open debate provides an opportunity for
the wider Membership of the United Nations to contribute
to the proposed draft resolution by sharing new ideas
and proposals. We are pleased that the co-sponsors have
already accommodated some proposals and trust that the
recommendations made during the course of this debate
will also be taken into consideration and reflected
in further adjustments to the draft resolution.
Mr President,
South Africa shares the concerns regarding the threat
that weapons of mass destruction pose not only to individual
countries, but also to the international community as
a whole. This threat is exacerbated by the possibility
that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the
hands of terrorist groups as well as those engaged in
the activities of networks dealing in the illicit transfer
of weapons of mass destruction-related technology and
materials. We are concerned, however, that the draft
resolution that we have before us only addresses the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, even then in
an incomplete manner.
There is a passing reference to disarmament in spite
of the fact that chemical and biological weapons have
been prohibited by international law and despite the
unequivocal undertaking of the Nuclear Weapon States
to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. On the issue of
non-proliferation, the resolution only addresses non-State
actors while ignoring the threat to international peace
and security posed by proliferation by States. If the
Council were not to act in a comprehensive manner, there
is a danger that loopholes may remain that could be
exploited by those who seek financial or political gain,
and by those who seek to achieve their objectives through
terror.
South Africa believes that the threat posed by weapons
of mass destruction can only be effectively addressed
if we use all of the instruments at our disposal - both
in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament.
The attempt to establish a mechanism in the Security
Council that is isolated from the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is a weakness that
may impact on the effectiveness of the measures being
considered in this resolution. It is South Africa's
belief that universal adherence to, and compliance with,
international agreements on weapons of mass destruction
and the complete elimination of these weapons provide
the international community with the only guarantee
against the threat or use of such weapons.
Mr. President,
It is important that the resolution before us should
be drafted in a manner that makes it practical and implementable
by States. The current draft resolution imposes obligations
on UN Member States and attempts to legislate on behalf
of States by prescribing the nature and type of measures
that will have to be implemented by States. This is
also the case where States have already accepted non-proliferation
obligations in terms of international treaties and other
legal instruments.
South Africa believes that this resolution could have
far-reaching legal and practical implications for Member
States, especially those that have a capacity in nuclear,
chemical and biological matters. In recognizing the
dual use nature of such materials, there may be potential
implications for a wide range of institutions, including
hospitals, laboratories, universities, veterinary clinics,
agricultural research centres and similar institutions.
In terms of South Africa's national legislation that
controls such materials, there are clearly defined lists
of items that are regulated.
This is also the case in schedules attached to the
Chemical Weapons Convention and other regimes such as
the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Such specified lists of control items are essential
to ensure that those controlling these items know exactly
what to control. The absence of such clearly defined
lists of items in the draft resolution could lead to
conflicting interpretations of controlled items and
to a multitude of control lists. A more effective and
sustainable approach would be to utilise the existing
mechanisms and regimes to ensure that they operate more
efficiently and effectively.
Mr. President,
My delegation believes that all Member States of the
UN would be opposed to the prospect of weapons of mass
destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors,
especially terrorists. The challenge for the Security
Council, whose mandate is the maintenance of international
peace and security, is to ensure that the systems that
we already have to control the technologies, material
and equipment for the production, and delivery, of weapons
of mass destruction are implemented more effectively
and improved, where necessary.
The efficiency of these systems, and the ability of
States to implement control measures in a way that will
prevent all of those - both States and non-State actors
- who wish to use these items for the development of
weapons of mass destruction depends on the sharing of
intelligence and information. It is unlikely, Mr President,
that any application for the transfer of a controlled
item would be to an end-user that is known to be a terrorist
organisation. It is more likely that front-companies
or front-end-users would be used instead.
The ability to prevent such a transfer is less dependent
on the fact that the item is controlled and more dependent
on information about the real end-use. This information
holds the key to success and can only be made available
through intelligence sharing. My delegation, Mr President,
believes that it is through this sharing of intelligence
information that the gap in non-proliferation controls
can be bridged.
I thank you, Mr. President.
Issued by the Permanent Mission of South Africa
For more information, please contact Zaheer Laher at
09 1 212 692 2460
United Nations, New York
22 April 2004
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