Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa's Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors, at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Addressing Verification Challenges.

VIENNA, AUSTRIA
16 OCTOBER 2006

Strengthening Safeguards: a developing country perspective

Chairperson,

It is indeed a pleasure for me to address this Symposium on the important issue of international safeguards. My presentation today will provide a perspective from South Africa as a developing country and should not be interpreted as the definitive position of developing countries on the issue of safeguards.

At the same time it should be also be noted that many academics, politicians, civil society formations as well as some governments in the developed world share the views and concerns of South Africa and other developing countries on these matters.

For all of us and for developing countries in particular, the IAEA remains an important vehicle, in accordance with its objectives as contained in Article II of its Statute, to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. At the same time, we recognise and accept that this potential contribution of atomic energy should not be used "in such a way to further any military purpose".

It is therefore not surprising that the development of safeguards has been one of the central preoccupations of the IAEA since its very inception almost 50 years ago. I am sure that we all would agree that the most significant development in this area during the last half a century was the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) during the late 1960's, early 1970's, which brought about a new legal foundation for the implementation of safeguards by the IAEA in the State Parties to the Treaty.

Much progress has been made in the universalisation of this Treaty. However, 36 years after its entry into force, a number of State Parties to the NPT have yet to take the first basic step in concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA as required under Article III of the NPT. In addition, a few have also opted not to join the NPT.

Chairperson,

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, the majority who are developing countries, benefit in two important ways from the Treaty. Firstly, the threat posed by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is constrained. Secondly, under the NPT there is a promise in Article IV of the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and of the transfer of technology, materials and equipment to those countries that could greatly benefit from it. Many interpret Article IV to be about the promotion of nuclear power. This is certainly true, but the requirements for developing States are in many instances more basic -- the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in health, agriculture and industry has the potential of affecting and improving the situations of millions of people. However, South Africa believes that this potential is underutilised and the only sustainable way forward would be to focus on transforming the budget procedure of the Agency to incorporate into the regular budget the technical co-operation fund and to enlarge its allocation.

There is growing concern, especially among developing countries, at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions. For all of us multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, developing countries believe that the IAEA-established multilateral mechanism is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues and challenges.

Developing countries have consistently emphasised that the Agency is the sole competent authority in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification. It is therefore our duty to fully support the Agency in fulfilling this mandate. South Africa attaches great importance to the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency and would not wish to do anything that would reduce or undermine its solemn responsibilities. We believe it is imperative that the Agency be permitted to undertake its verification work without undue pressure, hindrance or interference of any kind.

Notwithstanding the view of some that the Agency's budget should reflect zero real growth, we have the shared responsibility to ensure that we allocate sufficient resources to enable the Agency to implement its ever increasing safeguards mandate. As this is a shared responsibility we should not resort to voluntary funding of safeguards and related activities, as this could diminish our collective approach to safeguards and impact on the multilateral nature of the Agency.

Chairperson,

Developing countries believe that the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, should be without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting this right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They also believe that States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected. Just as for developed countries, developing countries also have a sovereign right to make their own decisions consistent with their national priorities and interest.

In terms of the application of the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, NPT States Parties have undertaken to pursue a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes only in conformity with their obligations under Articles I, II and III of the NPT. In verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, non-nuclear-weapon States have to conclude INFCIRC/153 type safeguard agreements with the Agency. It is the responsibility of the Agency, as the competent authority, to verify in accordance with these type of agreements, the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the NPT by these States Parties.

With the experience gained from the implementation of the safeguards system we should be prepared, as we have done in the past, to deal with shortcomings identified that placed a constraint on the effective implementation of this system. In this regard, through the 93+2 negotiations, we agreed to strengthened safeguards as a result of our experience with the Agency's verification work undertaken in Iraq.

Currently, the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification has been established by the Board of Governors with a view to consider further improvements to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The mandate of this Committee provides us with an opportunity to evaluate and possibly agree on recommendations that could improve the safeguards system. We should all co-operate with the Chair of the Committee, Ambassador Taous Feroukhi, to enable the Committee to successfully conclude its work.

The focus of the Agency's investigation is not to provide arguments or reasons for punitive actions to be undertaken. The focus is rather to facilitate a process whereby corrective action can be undertaken, within a reasonable time, to enable the Agency to verify non-diversion.

Chairperson,

The global non-proliferation and disarmament regime has faced some serious challenges during the 1990s. The end of the Cold War, the revelations about the existence of secret nuclear weapons programmes and illicit procurement networks have provided the drive for strengthening the IAEA's Safeguards System. This acknowledgement of the limitations inherent in the traditional safeguards system led to an extensive review and strengthening of the system. We can therefore indeed confirm that the IAEA, today, possesses greater capabilities to detect diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes and clandestine activities.

With regard to the assurance of non-diversion of nuclear material to military uses, developing countries have stated their strong conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

This obvious truth does not seem to make an impact on the thinking of major nuclear-weapon States who, notwithstanding the agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that de-linked general and complete disarmament from the elimination of nuclear weapons and that specifically provided a roadmap to eliminate these weapons, have since continued to insist on retaining a role for nuclear weapons in their military doctrine. This position is wrong and dangerous. Indeed it is this position that is creating a serious crisis for the NPT. It is also undermining the strengthened review process that we all agreed to in 1995 in exchange for the indefinite extension of the NPT.

South Africa's position on the mutually reinforcing processes of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is widely documented and shared by developing countries. The total elimination of all nuclear weapons is our common objective, and, therefore, the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are inextricably linked to each other. Our concerted efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be matched by a concurrent effort to eliminate, in a verifiable and irreversible manner, all nuclear weapons and universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Chairperson,

South Africa recognises and supports the legitimate right of all States to utilise the atom for peaceful purposes. At the same time, we are of the view that the ownership of the capability that could also be utilised to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the States concerned to build confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapon proliferation. South Africa believes that such States need to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency is able to verify that these capabilities are being used for peaceful purposes only, including through the mechanisms available under the Additional Protocol for strengthened safeguards.

In our view, the Additional Protocol remains an important instrument to build confidence and to provide assurances regarding the continued peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Chairperson,

South Africa therefore strongly supports universal adherence to IAEA Safeguards Agreements. South Africa not only destroyed the nuclear explosive devices developed by the Apartheid regime and closed down its dedicated facilities, but also gave the IAEA free access to information, materials, facilities and staff on the basis of "any time, any place", which is more than what is legally required under the Additional Protocol. South Africa further participated in the scheme approved by the IAEA Board in 1993 for the voluntary reporting of the export and import of specified equipment and non-nuclear material, similar to that, which was later provided for in Annex II of the Additional Protocol.

The Additional Protocol signed by South Africa on 13 September 2002 has indeed placed an extra burden on South Africa in terms of comprehensive information to be submitted and kept up to date. This is quite an onerous obligation to discharge. However, South Africa believes that this additional burden is by far outweighed by the advantages in terms of strengthening our goals of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

For many developing countries, particularly those with very limited or no nuclear facilities, the additional burden of implementing a protocol additional to their safeguards agreements is indeed a complicating factor that needs to be carefully considered by this Symposium.

A central question in this regard is whether any additional burdens that may be imposed through the strengthened safeguards system are commensurate with the potential non-proliferation benefits that can be derived from it and proportional to the country's nuclear capabilities and the potential threat for any potential diversion to non-peaceful activities.

Chairperson,

The illicit transfer of nuclear and nuclear related dual-use technology and materials that could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction remains of serious concern to the international community and poses a serious threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Delegates may be aware that the South African Government, in co-operation with other countries, as well as the IAEA, had undertaken an investigation with regard to the contravention of South Africa's Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993) and Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999).

These investigations were undertaken in the context of the so-called Khan network, as well as information obtained following Libya's announcement of the abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme. As a result of these investigations, a number of individuals were arrested and charged for contravening South African legislation by importing, exporting, possessing and producing certain controlled items without the necessary permits or authorisation.

During the course of our investigation, shipping containers were found at one company containing components of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, as well as related documentation. These containers were sealed by the South African Police Services and transported to a secure site, where they were also placed under IAEA seals. The investigation has been concluded and a number of arrests have been made and the matter is currently before the courts.

Chairperson,

The experience of the illicit trade in nuclear technology to manufacture nuclear weapons presents a serious challenge to the NPT, as the Director General reminded us at that time. It is of course important to tighten controls over nuclear material, technologies and equipment to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking. Experience has, however, shown that no control regime, no matter how comprehensive, can fully guarantee against abuse. The success of such controls remains dependent on the following:

1. Information-sharing and co-operation among the relevant parties.
2. Information-sharing and co-operation by all the parties with the IAEA.

However, this does not mean that we should not continue to focus on and improve controls and legislation governing nuclear material, equipment and technology. But critical in this context is the issue of penalties for contravening such legislation and the unequal treatment of offenders in different countries. We need to initiate a process to work towards the harmonisation of our respective penal clauses to ensure a more universal and consistent approach that is commensurate with the nature and scale of the offence.

At the same time, our investigations have illustrated the great and indispensable value of the Agency in terms of verifying our own assessment as well as in securing the relevant equipment and supporting documentation and support provided to the investigative process.

Chairperson,

It is important to focus on the capacity for the detection of illicit activities as well as the necessary investigations. This capability is not reflected in the formal legislation or regulations but relies on the availability of resources as well as training. This requires the necessary political will and priority, which normally emanates from multilateral discussions and negotiations, which can often be a long process. Like democracy within countries, it creates a holistic democratic and inclusive global society.

In conclusion Chairperson,

What we should strive for is not to place further limitations on the peaceful application of the atom by those who have already committed themselves not to pursue the nuclear weapons option.

Exactly a year ago the Nobel Committee announced in Oslo the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Director General, Dr ElBaradei, and to the Agency. We rejoiced at the time but also recognised the importance of the award for the work of the Agency and the integrity and professionalism of its Director General.

Recently we concluded the 50th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, inspired by the original concept of "atoms for peace". Our challenge now is to realise a world with "atoms only for peace".