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Statement by the Republic of South Africa during the General
Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Delivered by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty,
Deputy Director-General: Department of Foreign Affairs, Chairperson of the South
African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and South
Africa's Governor on the Board of the IAEA, New York, 3 May 2005 Mr
President, South Africa also congratulates you on your assumption of the
Presidency of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Likewise, I also congratulate the other members of the
Bureau on the assumption of their important positions. Please be assured of my
delegation's full co-operation and assistance to all office bearers during this
Review Conference. During the deliberations of this Review Conference, South
Africa will put forward its own views both in the context of this statement, as
well as in statements in the three Main Committees and during our consideration
of specific issues. My delegation also associates itself with the statements made
by the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition. Mr President, South
Africa believes that the NPT is not an instrument standing on its own. Over the
last 35 years, by becoming States Parties to the NPT, by entering into the relevant
IAEA safeguards agreements and by giving consensus agreement to commitments and
undertakings in the final documents of Review Conferences, the States Parties
have created the Treaty Regime. In this way the States Parties have made the NPT
the centrepiece of a Treaty Regime that encompasses an inter-linking network of
obligations, commitments and undertakings on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation
and allowing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 1995 decision
on the indefinite extension of the NPT was made possible by agreements on the
Strengthening of the Review Process for the Treaty and a set of Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The effect of these
inter-linking agreements was to make the decision on the Treaty's extension conditional
on undertakings and commitments that addressed the full range of NPT obligations
but also provided certainty on the continued existence of the Treaty. In
2000 we achieved a significant success by agreeing on the "unequivocal undertaking
by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed".
In addition, it had been agreed that nuclear disarmament is not part of some "ultimate"
objective, but a milestone to be reached on the way to the real objective of the
disarmament process, namely general and complete disarmament. To fulfil their
obligations under the Treaty, both the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon
States were to implement the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts
to eliminate nuclear weapons. In 1995 and 2000, we therefore collectively
made significant progress in reaching consensus agreements on obligations, commitments
and undertakings that not only improved the effectiveness of the Treaty Regime,
but also served further to entrench the central NPT bargains. South Africa believes
that the challenges flowing from 1995 and 2000 are to reinforce the NPT bargains
and to build on the commitments and undertakings that have already been agreed
to so as to continue on an irreversible path towards the achievement of the purposes
and objectives of the Treaty. In the run-up to 2005, there has, however,
been considerable concern about the effect of changed political dynamics on the
Treaty Regime and on the potential consequences for a successful outcome to the
2005 Review Conference. This was exacerbated by the failure of the preparatory
process for this Review Conference. Notwithstanding this setback, the continued
vitality and effectiveness of the NPT, as an instrument to achieve the international
community's common goals and as a building block for maintaining international
peace and security, is dependent on the implementation of the Treaty Regime as
a whole. South Africa recommends that we should guard against the continual reopening
of the debate on obligations, commitments and undertakings, which may provide
the logical foundation for others to also reinterpret, negate or withdraw from
other parts of the bargains struck. Mr. President, South Africa continues
to believe that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually
reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both
fronts. We are convinced that the only real guarantee against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that
they will never be produced again. South Africa therefore believes that we should
without delay accelerate the implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic
and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. In this connection, South
Africa strongly supports the proposal for the establishment of a subsidiary body
on nuclear disarmament at this Review Conference to give focused attention to
the issue. South Africa believes that nuclear weapons do not guarantee
security, rather, they distract from it. The longer nuclear weapons exist, the
longer the world will have to wait to be free from the use or threat of use of
such weapons. Many also fear that such weapons could also fall into the wrong
hands. However, our belief is that nuclear weapons are illegitimate, irrespective
of whose hands these weapons are in. Those who rely on nuclear weapons
to demonstrate and exercise power should recognise that such dependence on weapons
of mass destruction only serve to increase insecurity rather than promote security,
peace and development.
South Africa also recognizes that the recent developments
in and experiences of the illicit network in nuclear technology to manufacture
nuclear weapons presents a serious challenge to the NPT. South Africa believes
that it is important to review and improve controls over nuclear material, technologies
and equipment to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking.
It is for this reason, Mr. President that the South African government in co-operation
with other countries, as well as the IAEA, undertook a thorough and urgent investigation
into the contravention of relevant South African non-proliferation legislation
and is in the process of prosecuting those allegedly involved in these illicit
activities. This is yet another demonstration of South Africa's commitment to
the Treaty's non-proliferation provisions. Experience has, however, shown
that no control regime, no matter how comprehensive, can fully guarantee against
abuse. Furthermore, the success of such controls remain dependent on effective
information-sharing and co-operation among the relevant parties and the central
role the IAEA can - if allowed - play in addressing this illicit trade. South
Africa wishes to take this opportunity to again thank the IAEA for the constructive
role it is playing in the investigation of the network that has lead to the prosecution
of those involved in contravening South Africa's non-proliferation legislation.
While concerns have been expressed by some about the implementation of
nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Regime obligations, commitments and undertakings
by non-nuclear-weapon States parties, it should be recognized that the Regime's
non-proliferation obligations are largely being successfully implemented. With
respect to the concerns about Iran's use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,
we are pleased that the IAEA has so far found no diversion to military purposes.
We welcome the Paris Agreement and as President Mbeki has said, there is no need
for "a confrontation", over the matter, which can be resolved through
dialogue and negotiations. It is crucial that all the parties involved act with
sincerity and goodwill in accordance with the Paris Agreement. Mr. President, At
this Review Conference we should guard against the adoption of new measures that
would restrict the inalienable right of States Parties to verifiably utilise nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. There is a growing concern that while demands are
being made for non-nuclear-weapon States to agree to new measures in the name
of non-proliferation, concrete actions towards nuclear disarmament are neglected. South
Africa wishes to reiterate that it cannot support unwarranted restrictions on
the NPT's guaranteed access to such nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes
by States that are fully compliant with their obligations under the NPT. The imposition
of additional restrictive measures on some NPT States Parties while allowing others
to have access to these capabilities, only serves to exacerbate existing inequalities
that are already inherent in the NPT and undermines one of the central bargains
that are contained in the Treaty. South Africa notes the report on "Multilateral
Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle", which was recently submitted by the
Expert Group to the Director-General of the IAEA, and we stand ready to participate
in further work that might be undertaken on this issue. Mr. President, South
Africa notes with concern that around 40 States Parties have yet to take the first
basic step before the Additional Protocol can be signed, i.e. the conclusion of
a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as required by Article III of the Treaty.
We recognise that this may be due to the absence of a nuclear infrastructure in
many countries. Corresponding to paragraph 10 of the Principles and Objectives,
those States Parties who still have to fulfil this Treaty obligation are urged
to do so without delay. In this context, my delegation wishes to thank the IAEA
for its continued efforts to assist these States in guiding them through the process.
South Africa welcomes steps undertaken to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards
system. Not only were measures introduced for which the Agency always had the
legal authority to undertake, but the Additional Protocol was also negotiated
and the number of protocols that have been signed have grown significantly in
recent years. This, in our view, represents a recognition by States Parties of
the value of the Additional Protocol as an instrument for building confidence
in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Mr President, Non-nuclear-weapon
States benefit, potentially, in two important ways from the NPT. Firstly, the
threat posed by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is constrained. Secondly,
under the NPT there is a promise in Article IV of the promotion of nuclear energy
for peaceful uses and of the transfer of technology, materials and equipment to
those countries that could greatly benefit from it. Many interpret Article IV
to be primarily about the promotion of nuclear energy. This is certainly true,
but the requirements for developing States are in many instances more basic --
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in amongst others, health and agriculture
has the potential of positively affecting and improving the livelihood of countless
numbers of people. It is for this reason that South Africa places a high premium
on the IAEA's Technical Co-operation Programme, and why we are concerned about
the inability of the Voluntary TC Fund to meet the legitimate needs of developing
countries. In this respect, States Parties are urged to pledge and pay their contributions
to the TC Fund. Ways should be sought to make this Fund stable and assured as
required by paragraph 19 of the Principles and Objectives. Mr. President, The
challenge of the 2005 Review Conference is to ensure that the Treaty Regime emerges
as a strengthened instrument essential in circumscribing the threat posed by nuclear
weapons and by the proliferation of the capabilities to produce them as well as
guaranteeing access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Individual elements of
the NPT's bargains should not be deliberately isolated and then approached singularly,
or in a process where one or more of the individual elements are ignored or minimised.
Any desire, be it by the non-nuclear-weapon States or the nuclear-weapon States,
to address only one aspect of the NPT bargains - be it nuclear disarmament, nuclear
non-proliferation, safeguards, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or universality
- should be guarded against. The challenges facing international peace and
security today require from us all to ensure that the Treaty is indeed strengthened
in all its aspects. It is for this reason that the 2005 NPT Review Conference
is not just another meeting on the international conference calendar. In meeting
this expectation, South Africa would like to propose to the Conference that it
overcomes the near crisis for the Treaty and adopts a constructive and positive
approach that can provide the Review Conference with an opportunity to meet the
challenges that arise out of 1995 and 2000. We therefore need to focus our attention
on reaching consensus agreements on the obligations, commitments and undertakings
that are believed to be implementable and achievable in the period before 2010.
Such measures should, inter alia, include agreements on: - the necessity
for all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT,
and the early entry into force of the CTBT;
- measures to address the
proliferation threat posed by non-State actors;
- further reinforcing
the IAEA safeguards norm as a means to prevent proliferation;
- the special
responsibility of States owning the capability that could be used to develop nuclear
weapons to build confidence with the international community that would remove
any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation;
- the requirement that
all States must fully comply with commitments made to nuclear disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms
race;
- the necessity to accelerate the implementation of the 13 practical
steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament
agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference;
- the need for the nuclear-weapon
States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and
not to develop new types of nuclear weapons in accordance with their commitment
to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;
-
the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States
to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international
verification;
- the need to resume in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations
on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
fissile material treaty taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation objectives;
- the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary
body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament;
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the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear
disarmament measures, and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification
capabilities; and,
- the negotiation of legally binding security assurances
by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.
We
believe that these 12 inter-related measures, agreed by consensus, would constitute
the basis for work to be undertaken until 2010. Mr. President, After
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, millions within South Africa campaigned for
the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The national liberation movement
in South Africa opposed the apartheid bomb and supported the call of the Non-Aligned
Movement for nuclear disarmament and the redirection of the resources that would
thus be saved to the task of defeating poverty and underdevelopment. In
this regard, President Mbeki recently stated that "Because, from the very
beginning, our struggle was about saving lives, an objective that has found its
place in our national Constitution, which includes the right to life, our movement
was appalled by the threat to human existence posed by the use of nuclear weapons
of mass destruction. Like the rest of humanity, our people had also witnessed
the carnage caused by these weapons when the United States dropped them on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in Japan towards the end of the Second World War." He further
stated that "The situation should not be allowed to continue that the Nuclear
Weapons States oblige everybody merely to focus on the issue of non-proliferation,
while completely ignoring the demand of the overwhelming majority of humanity
for the complete abolition of WMDs, an objective which our country has already
achieved". During the process of our democratic transformation South
Africa voluntarily decided to dismantle its nuclear weapons arsenal with the hope
that this example would be emulated. On the contrary, South Africa like many others
remain deeply concerned by the continued retention of nuclear weapons and security
doctrines that envisage the use of nuclear weapons. Due to this reality, South
Africa believes that non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to be provided with
internationally legally binding security assurances under the NPT that would protect
them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in line with 1996 Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice, as well as proposals submitted
during the preparatory process for the Review Conference. Security assurances
would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and rightfully belongs
to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option. South Africa strongly believes
that security assurances should be considered in a subsidiary body in Main Committee
I of this Conference. In conclusion, Mr President, my delegation believes
that in order to make the world a safer place and prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, those who possess these weapons must begin a committed step-by-step
process to eliminate their nuclear weapons with a sense of urgency in accordance
with the commitments made at previous review conferences. Furthermore,
if we negotiate in good faith on the basis of obligations, commitments and undertakings
that are implementable and achievable in the foreseeable future and in the period
before 2010, this Review Conference would be able to significantly contribute
towards a more peaceful and secure tomorrow. Then, as States Parties, we will
emerge from this Review Conference with full confidence that the NPT is not under
threat. That, as partners, we will leave this Conference with a clear message
that the proliferation of material, equipment and technology that can be used
in the development of nuclear weapons will not be allowed and with the conviction
that our dream of a world without nuclear weapons is indeed becoming a reality. During
his State of the Nation address on 21 May 2004, President Mbeki committed South
Africa to work for a successful 2005 NPT Review Conference. We shall therefore
work relentlessly for the success of this Conference and we urge everybody gathered
here to co-operate in the interest of preserving and strengthening the NPT, the
cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful
use of nuclear energy. I thank you
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