Statement by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South
Africa, Mr. Aziz Pahad to the United Nations Security Council on the African Union
Cote D'Ivoire Mediation Mission, New York, March 28, 2005 Mr President,
Excellencies We thank Brazil, President of the Security Council for holding
this important meeting to consider the situation in Cote d'lvoire. We would
like to thank the Secretary General for his fourth progress report on the United
Nations Operation in Cote d'lvoire. The current crisis in Cote d'lvoire
began a decade ago when the leader of one of the Ivorian political parties and
former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara of the RDR, was prohibited from standing
as a candidate during the 1995 Presidential Elections. As a result of this, the
current President of Cote d'lvoire, and leader of the FPI, decided not to contest
those Presidential Elections. Consequently, this combination of circumstances
meant that a significant section of the Ivorian population had reservations about
the legitimacy of the Government formed after the 1995 Elections. This initiated
a political crisis that led to the December 25, 1999 coup d'etat, the first in
the country's history as an independent country. The 2000 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections did not solve this crisis, but, arguably, served further to entrench
it. This was because, among other things, these Elections excluded Alassane
Ouattara and former President Henri Konan Bedie, leader of the PDCI-RDA, from
the Presidential Elections; and resulted in the boycott of the Parliamentary Elections
by the RDR; and were characterised by low voter participation. The situation worsened
radically when there was an attempted coup d'etat in September 2002, which resulted
in the division of the country into two parts, with the South controlled by the
Government and the North by the rebel forces, the Forces Nouvelles. In January
2003, the various political forces of Cote d'lvoire, including the Government,
concluded an agreement at Linas Marcoussis, France, which spelt out various steps
intended to end the Ivorian crisis. Before this, the Economic Community
of West African States, ECOWAS, had also been involved in sustained efforts to
help resolve the problems of Cote d'lvoire, a member state of the Economic Community.
The UN subsequently joined ECOWAS in this process, after the Security Council
set up the United Nations Mission in Cote d'lvoire (MINUCI) in May 2003, which
was subsequently replaced by ONUCI as from April 4, 2004. Concerned that by July
2004, none of these various interventions had produced any satisfactory result,
the UN Secretary General, H.E. Mr Kofi Annan, acting in cooperation with the then
Chairperson of ECOWAS, H.E. President John Kufuor, convened a meeting in Accra,
Ghana at the end of July 2004. This meeting was attended by the UN SG, the Ivorian
political leaders, and a significant number of African Heads of State and Government,
drawn from all the African sub-regions. Among other things, the meeting, entitled
Accra III, set deadlines for the implementation of various measures to expedite
the peace process in Cote d'lvoire. On October 19, 2004, two-and-a-half
months after Accra III, the UN SG expressed serious concern at the failure of
the Ivorian parties to meet the deadlines contained in the Accra III Agreement.
ECOWAS echoed this statement a few days later, stating that it "fully shares
the views expressed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan." Following
the expression of these legitimate concerns, the situation in Cote d'lvoire seemed
to move even further away from a resolution of the crisis addressed during the
Accra meeting, and the implementation of the Accra III Agreement. This was
caused by the unacceptable November 4-6, 2004 attacks against the Forces Nouvelles,
carried out by the Ivorian Air Force, which also included the apparently accidental
bombing of the positions of Licome, and the death of a number of French soldiers. The
French soldiers, in turn, destroyed some military planes belonging to the Ivorian
forces. The Young Patriots were out in the streets in their thousands and foreigners
were being evacuated from Cote d'lvoire. The airport in Abidjan was closed down.
Business premises were destroyed and some homes attacked. There was shooting outside
the Hotel Ivoire. It was in the light of all these developments, immediately
preceding and following the November events, and the fact that the peace process
in Cote d'lvoire seemed to have reached a cul-de-sac, that the Chairperson of
the African Union, H.E. President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, asked H.E. President
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to act as the Mediator of the AU to expedite the Ivorian
peace process. Understanding the urgency of this matter, President Mbeki
acted immediately to respond to the request of the AU Chairperson. Accordingly,
he visited Abidjan on November 9, 2004, even as this city was in the grip of a
serious security crisis following the events of the 4 - 6 November. This
necessitated that instead of waiting until security in Abidjan and Cote d'lvoire
was guaranteed, President Mbeki had to provide his own security as well as secure
the cooperation of the governments of Cote d'lvoire and France, to ensure that
he acted immediately to honour the request of the AU. That sense of urgency
continues to inform the activities of the AU Mediation, especially given the need
to hold the next Presidential Election in October this year, as planned, and the
fact of the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Cote d'lvoire. After
considering the interventions that had been made since 2002 to solve the Ivorian
crisis and having engaged the entire spectrum of the Ivorian political leadership
in discussion, the AU Mediation arrived at the following important conclusions: -
That, as mandated, it should seek a solution of the Ivorian crisis within the
framework of the Linas Marcoussis and the Accra II and III Agreements;
-
That it should work out a Road Map with specific time frames, indicating a variety
of steps that would have to be taken to put the Ivorian peace process back on
course; and,
- That all the Ivorian parties should agree to these propositions,
and thus commit themselves to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the Ivorian
crisis.
We are pleased to confirm to the Security Council that the
continuing efforts of the Mediation are based on the acceptance of these fundamental
propositions by all the Ivorian parties. As the Security Council knows,
and as is normal in any situation of protracted conflict, as in Cote d'lvoire,
deep-seated mistrust among the Ivorian leaders continues to bedevil the advance
towards the resolution of the Ivorian crisis. We therefore consider it of
cardinal importance that despite the differences among themselves, the Ivorian
leadership is at least united behind the three fundamental propositions we have
mentioned, without which it would be impossible to arrive at a peaceful and negotiated
solution of the Ivorian crisis. We would also like to emphasise this point
because it is clear that the peace settlement in Cote d'lvoire requires the cooperation
and involvement of all the Ivorian leaders. It is therefore vitally important
that we operate on the basis of the principle and practice of inclusion rather
than exclusion. This is especially important given that the ideology and
practice of exclusion lie at the very heart of the Ivorian crisis. Accordingly,
this crisis cannot be solved on the basis of the exclusion or marginalisation
of any of the players that Cote d'lvoire needs to arrive at a lasting settlement. Needless
to say, this does not mean that any of these players has a right wilfully to obstruct
or block progress towards this settlement. It is therefore centrally important
that the Security Council and the African Union should have the possibility to
impose effective sanctions against any of these players who might act wilfully
to deny the people of Cote d'lvoire their right to peace, democracy and development. We
appreciate the fact that the Security Council is fully conscious of the factors
that led to the Ivorian crisis, including those we have not mentioned. Nevertheless
we must emphasise the distinguishing feature of contemporary Cote d'lvoire, which
marks it out as the home of many African national groups, some of which originate
from the neighbouring countries. Pervasive poverty makes it inevitable that
the struggle for access to economic resources and opportunities must be a distinct
feature of African politics. The liberal policies implemented by Cote d'lvoire
since independence, combined with the regional developments during the colonial
period, resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan population in Cote d'lvoire. Consequently,
a significant proportion of this population, of different generations, originates
from the neighbouring countries. As has happened in many other countries everywhere
else in the world, in conditions of relative socio-economic hardship, xenophobic
tensions arise. In Cote d'lvoire, this has found expression in the concept of
"ivoirite". As the Security Council knows, the fundamental and
long-term solution of the Ivorian crisis requires that Cote d'lvoire should successfully
address a whole range of matters, including issues that bear on nationality, political
rights, the land question, and coexistence in a multi-cuttural, multi-ethnic
and multi-religious society. All this signifies that the understandable
concern to address immediate issues, which might be symptoms of more fundamental
problems, should not result in short-term solutions that make it more difficult
to arrive at solutions that address the more long-term and therefore more fundamental
problems of Ivorian society. Both the AU and the UN have an obligation to
pursue the solution of the Ivorian crisis with sober minds, and resist the temptation
to arrive at short-term solutions that disguise the real problems, and therefore
create the basis for a more intractable crisis in future. The AU Mediation
is preoccupied with all these considerations, and works on the basis of the inter-connection
between the short and long term interests of the Ivorian people. In this regard,
we sincerely hope that the UN and all those interested in the future of Cote d'lvoire,
should not allow for an unbalanced approach among the short, medium and long term
interests of the Ivorian people. We believe that the Security Council is
in possession of the Reports that the AU Mediation has submitted to the Chairperson
of the AU, especially the third Report of December 9, 2004. We attached
our Road Map to this Report. We continue to pursue this Road Map with the Ivorian
parties as the only available route towards the settlement of the Ivorian crisis. We
would also like to take advantage of this opportunity to thank all the people
who contributed to the elaboration of this Road Map. As the Security Council is
aware, President Mbeki asked various institutions to join his delegation when
he visited Cote d'lvoire last December. Accordingly, his delegation included
representatives of the UN Secretary General, the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the World
Bank and the IMF. The Road Map to which we have referred was drawn up by this
delegation together, rather than the AU Mediation on its own. The AU Mediation
was pleased that the important institutions we have just indicated could take
joint ownership of the programme of action that emerged out of a five-day process
of detailed consultations with all the Ivorian parties. Apart from anything
else, all this confirmed the importance of the follow-up mechanisms provided for
in the Linas Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements, and the obvious need for the
AU Mediation to work together with these mechanisms. With your permission,
we will now proceed to indicate the progress and problems we have experienced
with regard to the implementation of the Road Map, copies of which we believe
each member of the Security Council has. But first we would like to draw the attention
of the Security Council to some principled conclusions. In general, the
AU Mediation believes that significant progress has been made with regard to the
adoption of the legislation prescribed by the Linas Marcoussis Agreement. We will
report on the outstanding challenges in this regard. The constitutional
text of Article 35 agreed at Linas Marcoussis, relating to the matter of eligibility
for the Presidency, has been adopted by the National Assembly, by a majority than
is even larger than that prescribed by the Constitution of Cote d'lvoire. However,
the process of amending the Ivorian Constitution in this regard has not been finalised. In
this regard, we must make the observation that the Ivorian Constitution requires
that all amendments on matters affecting the election of the President of the
Republic should be approved by referendum. No provision exists in the Ivorian
Constitution that would exclude Article 35 from this stricture. As indicated
in the Accra III Agreement, it is possible to override the Constitutional provisions
with regard to Article 35, provided that exceptional circumstances in Cote d'lvoire
make it physically impossible to hold a referendum. The AU Mediation believes
that it is necessary to get the collective view of the Ivorian political leadership
to arrive at the optimal position for the finalisation of the Article 35 matter,
in both the immediate and the long-term interests of Cote d'lvoire. The AU Mediation
is therefore taking the necessary steps in this regard. The DDR process
should start as soon as the Regroupment/Assembly sites have been prepared, to
enable them to receive members of FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles. Some concern
has been expressed about the commitment of especially the FN to start with DDR.
The Mediation approach to this matter is that we should accept the FN expressed
willingness to go into regroupment sites. Our task is to ensure that the DDR sites
in the north are ready. Later in this presentation, we will provide the necessary
details in this regard. The Government of National Reconciliation, the principal
state institution responsible for the implementation of the various transitional
measures leading up to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections later this
year, is still not functioning effectively. In part, this is due to the continuing
non-participation in this Government of the Ministers of the Forces Nouvelles.
We will give the Security Council further details in this regard. Various
problems continue to persist with regard to the general political and security
situation, which undermine the peace process in Cote d'lvoire. For example, this
was manifested by the recent unacceptable events in the western part of the country,
when an armed group from the South crossed the Confidence Zone in violation of
the Ceasefire, which resulted in a number of people being killed. The western
part of Cote d'lvoire has a long history of conflict that could be exploited.
Close attention would have to be paid to some of the underlying causes of such
conflict. The FN informed the mediation about possible new attacks on its positions.
The Mediation communicated this information to ONUCI. As we have already
indicated, the AU Mediation and the Ivorian parties are committed to the holding
of the Presidential Elections in October, as scheduled. The Mediation is therefore
ready to engage the electoral calendar the Prime Minister has drawn up, targeted
at ensuring that the Elections later this year are held as scheduled. The
FN and G7 have called for the United Nations to play a bigger role in the conduct
of the elections. The Mediator raised this matter with President Gbagbo during
the visit in December 2004. He indicated that they would welcome such assistance.
What remains is for the UN to indicate how such a role may be defined. The Ivorian
parties need assistance with ideas and proposals of what is possible; they are
not themselves able to make specific proposals. The Mediator has communicated
this request to the UN Secretariat and awaits their urgent response. The
AU Mediation is also concerned that the necessary steps should be taken to ensure
the unity, peace and stability of Cote d'lvoire, after the completion of the stage
of the transitional period that will conclude with the Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections later this year. However, the Mediation is fully conscious of
the reality that to get to the situation when, after the elections, practical
steps can be taken in this regard, it is vitally important that the Road Map is
implemented in a manner and within time frames that will ensure that credible
elections are held later this year, as planned. To resolve the outstanding
challenges with regard to the implementation of the Road Map, and ensure further
movement towards a lasting peace in Cote d'lvoire, a critical meeting between
President Mbeki and the principal political leaders of Cote d'lvoire will take
place in South Africa in six (6) days' time. The AU Mediation will be honoured
to report to the AU, the UN Security Council and the Ivorian people about the
outcome of this immensely important meeting. We would now like to revert
to the details of the matters to which we have referred in general terms. THE
LEGISLATIVE REPORT The parties agreed that the Mediation should constitute
a legal team that would make a determination about the compliance of legislation
passed with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The Mediation constituted a team of
lawyers from Burundi, Rwanda and South Africa. This team travelled to Cote d'lvoire
and had extensive interaction with the Ivorian parties. The team then submitted
their determination to the Mediator, who accepted their findings. A copy of the
legal report is attached to this presentation for the information of the Security
Council members. The findings of the legal team confirm that significant
progress had been made in relation to this part of the Agreements. Even though
there were differences among the parties on the appropriate legislative texts,
such differences related mainly to the interpretation of Linas-Marcoussis, rather
than a reluctance to implement the Agreements. There are areas where the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement is not totally in line with prevailing international practice, such
as in respect of the composition of a Human Rights Commission. The legal team's
mandate, however, was not to improve Linas-Marcoussis or to bring it in line with
current international practice, but to interpret it; strictly. The findings
of the legal team have been presented to the Ivorian parties and have largely
been well received. Some of the parties indicated that they still wish to raise
some political issues arising out of the legal report. DDR There has
been little progress on DDR. One complaint from the FN is that the GNR has no
comprehensive plan for the restructuring of the new defence force in Cote d'lvoire.
The Mediation has urged the Prime Minister to ensure that such a comprehensive
plan is adopted by the government. The Prime Minister has initiated a programme
leading to such adoption. The FN have also raised concern that they fear
being attacked once they move their forces into DDR sites. To assist in this regard,
the Mediation has proposed that an African country be approached to supply additional
forces to ONUCI with a view to secure FN DDR sites. Such a force would be under
the control of ONUCI, but would be deployed to ensure security around FN sites.
The FN have assured the Mediation that they are ready to start the DDR process.
They have gone on a month-long sensitization process to prepare their forces for
DDR. The Secretary General of the FN has issued an instruction to that effect. The
main challenge with DDR is that the regroupment areas in the North are not ready.
The Mediation has been part of a team of experts from ONUCI and the CNDDR that
has been conducting inspection of such areas with a view to determining how best
to expedite the rehabilitation of sites in the north. The Ivorian defence forces,
FANCI, has indicated that they are ready to start the DDR. THE FUNCTIONING
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION The GNR is still not functioning
properly. The main problem in this regard is that Ministers from the FN have raised
concern about their security in Abidjan. The Mediation sent some South African
security experts to Cote d'lvoire to assist in resolving this matter. The experts
have now prepared a comprehensive security plan which will be presented to the
Ivorian parties at the meeting scheduled for April 3, 2005. To conclude,
the AU Mediation would like to take advantage of this meeting of the Security
Council sincerely to thank the Council, and the UN as a whole, for their sustained
interest in the speedy resolution of the Ivorian crisis. We request that you remain
seized of this question. We request that the Security Council should be
ready expeditiously to take all such decisions as may be necessary to empower
ONUCI and the Special Representative of the Secretary General to help secure a
peaceful resolution of the Ivorian crisis. We welcome the Secretary General's
recommendation for the emergency deployment of an additional 1 226 troops. In
this context, we are privileged to make the solemn commitment that the AU and
its Mediation will cooperate fully with the UN Security Council, the Secretary
General and other UN institutions and personnel, to help bring lasting peace to
Cote d'lvoire as a matter of urgency. We also trust that in their conduct,
the UN and all its institutions and agencies, will respect and support the peoples
of Africa, represented by the African Union, as they strive to find an African
solution to the eminently African problem of the Ivorian crisis. We therefore
appeal to the Council that it should sincerely coordinate its future actions on
Cote d'lvoire with the African Union, in the interest of genuine peace, stability
and development in a united Cote d'lvoire. The African Union understands,
respects and supports the global responsibilities of the United Nations and the
Security Council on various matters, including the central matter of international
peace and security. The Union is also firmly committed to its own responsibilities
with regard to the future of Africa, and therefore the elimination of all threats
to international peace and security that emanate from our Continent. We
believe that these considerations provide a firm basis for a properly structured
relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council,
which would further reinforce global progress towards world peace and lasting
universal stability. The African Union is ready to do everything it can to ensure
that Africa contributes to these outcomes. We would also like to assure
the members of the Security Council, both singly and collectively, that the African
Union is unreservedly determined to help resolve the Ivorian crisis within the
context of the parameters we have indicated in this Statement. We look forward
to effective cooperation between the UN and the AU in this regard and thank you,
Mr President, esteemed members of the Security and Your Excellency, Secretary
General, for the opportunity you have given to the AU Mediation on Cote d'lvoire
to address this august body. We trust that what we have said will help the
Security Council to take the necessary and correct decisions that will expedite
the advance towards the solution of the protracted crisis in Cote d'lvoire. I
thank you for your kind attention. Department of Foreign Affairs Private
Bag X152 Pretoria 0001 28 March 2005
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