Notes following media briefing by Ambassador Abdul Minty on the IAEA report on Iran and Mr Xolisa Mabhongo on UN Security Council issues, Union Buildings, Pretoria, Thursday 28 February 2008

Ambassador Minty

Good morning ladies and gentlemen I just wanted to also let you know that I’m in Oslo for a two-day meeting on the global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.  This was convened by the Norwegian Government in cooperation with a number of institutions from the United States, and former Secretary of the US, Mr George Schultz and others.  You may recall that they are part of a four person initiative in the United States where they have declared that nuclear weapons should be eliminated. 

We’ll try and ensure that you’ll have the substance of that over the weekend.  I know our media in South Africa will be interested in that.

Now coming to the issues before us with regard to the report to the Board of Governors, issued on the 22nd of February, which the Board will start discussing on Monday.  We are pleased to note that all the outstanding issues that had existed have been clarified.  The important point to note with regard to that is that this also includes those issues which originally gave rise to the demand for confidence building measures of suspending the uranium enrichment programme.  And as you know that is the call made by Security Council that Iran should suspend its uranium enrichment programme, because those issues had not been clarified.

Now that they’ve been clarified it obviously builds a slightly increased confidence in the Iranian programme. And we need to continue with the verification issues that the Agency can carry out.  If we do that we can move forward by overcoming what the DG reported a month ago about the diminishment of information from Iran.

In this report what is significant is that they have managed to clarify all the outstanding issues.  And it also means that Iran has in some way moved towards the implementation of the Additional Protocol on a de facto basis.  As you know they at the moment refuse to sign the Additional Protocol.

Now the situation as we see it is that we should not take any action in the Security Council or elsewhere which can create the risk that Iran reduces or even terminates its cooperation with the IAEA.

Now with all the earlier issues clarified, one sensitive issue that remains is the so-called weaponisation by Iran.  And in this respect the Director General was able to convey to Iran declassified documents by the United States only in February and some further documents only a week before the report was issued.  So we clearly need more time for the Iranian response and also for the Agency to consider that response. 

You may have seen that there are already some reports that Iran says that all those matters are fabricated and there is no truth in it.  We do need to look at it because we think it’s an important issue.  If there is evidence of weaponisation, of course it could change the character of the whole arrangement.  And as you know South Africa’s policy is that we do not want a nuclear armed Iran but also we do not want war over Iran.

So it is absolutely essential that the verification process is continued, that the Agency is not in any way hampered, and nor do we have any risk that Iran terminates the cooperation with the Agency just when we’ve come to this weaponisation issue.   However it is very reassuring to know that the other outstanding issues have been clarified.

With regard to one matter of contamination of enriched uranium, the Agency needs to confirm the facts with Pakistan which is a source of that particular item.  So there is ongoing work.

Now in this respect we’ve seen that the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council introduced a resolution or took the initiative one day before the Board of Governors report was issued by the Director General.  And it is our view, and we’ve shared it with members of the Security Council, that it is very important to study the report to the Board of Governors.  Secondly, to wait for the verbal report that the Director General is due to give us next Monday.  To wait then for the Board of Governors to consider the whole matter, and after that we are all in a position to make judgement as to how we move forward.  It seems a bit odd that the Security Council’s resolution is drafted and almost concluded without any reference whatsoever to the report of the Director General of the IAEA.

You will recall that the original effort to take the matter to the Security Council was also motivated, and this was stated by the sponsors to reinforce the dissuasions of the IAEA and indeed to give it more authority.  So it would seem strange that in this case where we have the report of the IAEA coming, the resolution was to be tabled a day before the actual report.

So it is very important for us not to simply look at resolutions that are simply now saying that Iran has not complied with the previous resolution and therefore has to implement it.  But in that context also take into account the facts that have now been conveyed in the report of the IAEA.

We do need more credible assurances from Iran.  We do need Iran to implement the Additional Protocol or to act as if they have adopted the additional protocol.  As some of you may recall that a few years ago, as a result of my discussions with the Iranian government in Tehran, they subsequently agreed to our request that they should implement the Additional Protocol as if they have ratified it.  That cooperation in terms of the Additional Protocol was terminated when the matter was taken to the Security Council.

So the confidence deficit that exists in the context of the almost two-decades of the IAEA not getting information on the various plans by Iran then of course needs to be built.  And now we are well on the way to doing it because all the outstanding issues in the El Baradei plan with Iran have been clarified.  We do need to work for a creative solution to defuse the confrontation and to move toward negotiation.

There are also some provisions in the existing text of the resolution that are of concern.  For example, it provides for the inspection of Iranian cargo.  And we are concerned that that kind of boarding of ships or whatever it could entail, could also spark off conflict and could escalate into a war, which would not be desirable.  So we do need to look at those matters very carefully to see that it does not spark a movement toward further confrontation.

The IAEA’s work is also consistent with the work of the US intelligence agency which stated that Iran does not have any current nuclear weapons programme. 

Now the suspension issue is important of course for the sponsors of the resolution, and it looks as if took them something like nine months to move forward on the resolution of March.  And once the Security Council permanent members got the agreement they of course admitted it to all of us in the Security Council.

We have serious concerns about that because it took them nine months to agree a resolution.  They should really provide more time for the elected members of the Security Council also to consider the matter and to interact with each other in order to move forward in a constructive manner.

As you know South Africa has always had reservations about taking the matter to the Security Council because we felt that the process could escalate and then we would lose sight of the actual issues involved and it could just become a confrontational process.

We should also note that the resolution as we’ve been informed the sponsors want us to vote on it on Friday that is tomorrow.  That of course would create difficulties for those members of the Security Council that place an importance on verification and the need to study the report of the IAEA.  However, it is also important to emphasise that by simply adopting the same or very similar resolution after the discussion in the Board of Governors in itself would not constitute a constructive approach.  Because it doesn’t mean that one simply waits in an automatic way for the Board to consider it and then still goes ahead with the current resolution. 

So there should be a serious effort made by all parties to pay careful attention to the DG’s report on Monday, verbal report he gives, because he’ll also be able to cover the ground that has been achieved from the 22nd of February until the 3rd of March.  And then also see how the Board members consider it.

To just brief you about the process, we as Governors on the Board consult with each other.  We consult with the Secretariat.  We consult with the inspectors who’ve been conducting the inspections.  We also meet in the Non-Aligned Movement and have a Non-Aligned statement just as the European Union members have their own collective statement.  So there are a whole lot of processes that we still need to go through in Vienna before we can move forward. 

So this is a process that we are waiting for.  We think that much has been achieved as the report itself says.  And we are very pleased that the work plan initiated by Dr El Baradei with Iran has actually now been concluded, with all the outstanding issues clarified.

So the other factor is that it raises the whole issue of the credibility of the Security Council if it wishes to move forward on issues without taking any account of the report of Dr El Baradei.  So this is really the current position.

There is also one matter that has to be cleared of contamination with Pakistan.  The Agency is confident that Pakistan will clear this as it has cleared other similar matters in the past.  Thank you very much.

Questions and Answers

Question:  I just wanted to ask you to clarify for me because I’m not quite sure what the work plan entails in detail. But those two issues that you mentioned that have not been clarified: the weaponisation issue and also the contamination issue which you mentioned would entail consulting with Pakistan.  Were those not part of the work plan?

Answer:  You see what happened was that the Pakistan contamination issue is something that has happened before and I don’t think it’s an obstacle.  What has happened before is that when they found what they call contamination, enriched uranium contamination in actual machinery in a plant, the Iranians gave an explanation and provided them documents and so on.  The Agency has to go to Pakistan to say did you supply these things.  And in all the other issues which were similar to get assurances from Pakistan they were able to clarify.  So I think it’s a question of time rather than substance.  And the Agency is not dealing with it as an issue that has not been clarified.  They say it is clarified but they need to go forward.  Now in the work plan they’ve listed all the outstanding issues that have been existing since 2003.  And then had an approach that they would clarify all that.  Iran agreed to clarify all those and they included the issues which resulted in the concern that Iran should stop its enrichment programme, build confidence and so on.  So the very issues that created concern which led to the suspension of the enrichment and later the resumption of that suspension when Iran stopped that voluntary measure.  Those issues have now been clarified.  So, to that extent there is now, if you wish, increasing confidence in the Iranian programme.  However we can only have full confidence in the programme if we can implement the Additional Protocol to allow the agency to almost go at anytime and inspect any facility.  So, we need to work towards that.  With regard to weaponisation, what happened is that one member provided the IAEA with allegations about Iran having weaponised and having experimented with something and having a war-head that would be consistent with having a nuclear charge in it.  So this information was only provided to Iran by the IAEA once the United States allowed the document to be declassified.  That was only done in February.  And further documents were provided by the Agency to Iran just a week before it issued its own report.  So it is very important for us to get a further report from the Director General to see if there is progress on it.  In addition, any explanation that Iran gives to the inspectors, the inspectors also need time to process that so that they are satisfied that whatever explanation they are given is valid.  So this weaponisation issue is of critical importance because we have to make sure that it is verified by the Agency in cooperation with Iran.  Therefore it is an additional reason for us not to risk any breakdown in cooperation between the Agency and Iran.  Because Iran has stated that if the matter is allowed or gets another resolution in the Security Council then they will not continue the existing cooperation with the IAEA.  So we have that added risk that we have to consider.

Question: Ambassador, am I understanding you right when you said if Iran signs the Additional Protocol the possibility that the file will return to the IAEA from the UN Security Council will be increased?

Answer:  You see those who have introduced the resolution in the Security Council have a number of demands.  One is that the heavy water programme should be replaced with a light water programme.  Secondly, that Iran must suspend its enrichment processes going on now.  And then it must also sign the Additional Protocol and rectify it or implement it.  So that is the demand from the six countries which has been approved and passed by the Security Council.  So what we are saying now is that the last report of the Director General in November did not reflect as much cooperation by Iran going beyond Iran’s safeguard agreements.  In this report, Iran has gone further beyond safeguard agreements well into the arena of what will be covered by an Additional Protocol.  But there is no formal commitment by Iran to implement the Additional Protocol as if they’ve rectified it, which they did before as a result of the South Africa-Iranian engagement.  So if we are to move toward Iran implementing the Additional Protocol which gives the Agency greater insight into the programme and greater capacity, then obviously we shouldn’t risk any rupture in the relations between the IAEA and Iran, which may come about as a result of further action by the Security Council.

Question:  Ambassador could I ask you if the P5 are determined to go ahead and have this resolution, as you suggested they might, will South Africa oppose, abstain or whatever?

Answer:  Well no decision has been taken on the actual vote.  As we normally do we try to argue a case and discuss it with them.  Whether there are some media reports that they may delay it now, contrary to what they have indicated to us, the procedure in the Security Council means that they put a text to what they are going to do and they would have to do it today, Thursday.  And once they do that normally that’s an indication of trying to get a vote as soon as possible after that.  And that is the end, if you wish, of any negotiations about the text.  So we’ll have to await that because of the time difference between us and New York to see whether such a text is tabled today.  Then there may be a vote tomorrow, of course they are still free to delay the vote.  What I wanted to emphasise is that a simple delay does not necessarily mean that is the wisest action because we really need to digest and implement those reports in terms of the Board itself considering it.  Once that is done and our interactions take place, we are awaiting for example the DG’s report about what had happened in the last ten day or so.  He will give a verbal report to the Board, which is normally the case.  And that by the way is the only opportunity for the Governors of the Board to interact with the Director General in person because his document arrives as a written document.  And then there are also briefings by technical people, and we can also engage with them as members of the Board if we so wish.  So those processes need to go through.

Question: The Americans have said that Mr... (DDG and Chief official who runs the inspections system) gave a report to the Board of Governors, and according to them expressed the same sort of concerns about the weaponisation as the US has.  I just wondered if you could respond to that.

Answer:  What happened is that a week before the Board meets the head of the IAEA section that deals with inspections provides an opportunity for members of the Board or their representatives to get a briefing if they have any questions.  So that certainly took place a few days ago, I wasn’t there our Embassy’s representatives were there.  And if he has expressed any concerns about the weaponisation it is the same concern that I have expressed.  Now the question is there are allegations, apparently according to the media, that have come about as a result of a notable computer that was stolen with plans and other details.  The Iranians have initially reacted by saying those are false allegations and fabricated material.  The Agency has given them some further documents, I think it was on 15 February.  So the time between 15 February and 22 February when the report was issued would not give enough time for processing what has happened.  So that aspect, the weaponisation, is work in progress.  As I said earlier it would be extremely serious if through that is established that Iran had made plans or has plans to weaponise nuclear war-heads.   That would move towards a weaponisation.  South Africa of course does not want a nuclear armed Iran.  So it is critically important to verify that properly.  But the Agency will need more time to try and process all that information in light of whatever explanation Iran provides.   If however there is a finding that there is no basis of that then of course it places a different context to the work plan that is completed.   So far the only evidence we have is one from the Agency throughout the whole process they have not found a single item that may have been lost or diverted for military purposes.  Then we had the US intelligence report, at the end of last year, by 17 intelligence agencies.  Those came to the conclusion that Iran does not have a current programme of weaponisation.  So we have to look at whatever new evidence has been provided by one or more countries to the Agency.  That’s confidential, we as Board members have not seen that information.  That’s a matter of confidence between those who supplied the information through the Secretariat of the Agency, and then the Agency must prove it with the country concerned, in this case Iran.  As I’m saying it is extremely important that we clarify the issue and we don’t do anything that will lead, as a result of the Security Council resolution, with Iran not cooperating any further with the Agency in clarifying these matters.

Mr Xolisa Mabhongo

Good morning.  In our last media briefing we had indicated that South Africa had started to prepare for its Presidency of the UN Security Council in April 2008.  Today we wish to update you on progress with that.

Firstly just to indicate that indeed we are stepping up our efforts to prepare for the Presidency in April.

The UN Security Council this week agreed on a letter that will be sent to Addis Ababa to the AU Peace and Security Council to invite them to a meeting on the 16th of April in New York.

This will be a meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU and UN Security Council. So the date has been agreed – it will be on the 16th of April. 

And as I have indicated the UN Security Council this week sent a letter, through its current President  this week the UN Security Council, under its current Presidency, to Addis Ababa to invite the Peace and Security Council.

So the Terms of Reference and final agenda for this meeting will be finalised in the next few weeks.

Our mission in New York will be consulting again with all the other members of the Security Council to finalise the Terms of Reference and to agree on the agenda.

Then again the date for the debate on the relationship between the UN and the AU, in particular its Security Council and the Peace and Security Council has been agreed. So this debate is going to take place on the 17th of April.

So these two meetings are back to back – on the 16th of April it will be the meeting of the two Councils then on the 17th it will be the open debate, looking again at the relationship between the UN and the regional organisations, in particular the AU.

The outcomes of the two meetings, we hope that the joint-meeting on the 16th of April will agree on a joint-communiqué between the two councils, then on the 17th we hope the outcome will be a resolution of the Security Council.

So that is basically the update with regard to our Presidency, but again I think the point we want to reinforce is that we are stepping up our preparations for this and we still hope and insist as South Africa that the outcomes should be really concrete from these engagements.

MIDDLE EAST

The second issue that I thought we should just mention today is a briefing on the situation in the Middle East – as you know the situation in the Middle East – there has been serious challenges in the past few months.

So there was a meeting of the Security Council on 26 February 2008 to look at the political developments in the Middle East.

So this meeting had a briefing by the new United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, Mr Robert Serry. 

So I will just highlight the things that Mr Serry said, based on his observations on what is happening there and also how South Africa looks at this and the interventions that were made then.

Mr Serry’s presentation underlined the increasing need for the UN to find solutions to current political, development, humanitarian and human rights situation of the Palestinian population. Because he had just visited, he stated that the security situation has not improved with many more people, particularly the Palestinians, being killed and injured. And also importantly he noted that a number of these victims are children.

He indicated that despite difficulties on the ground, negotiations on the core issues between Israel and Palestine are continuing. He also reflected on efforts being undertaken by Prime Minster Fayyad to promote good governance and the revival of the economy as well as to promote security.  He highlighted also a number of issues that are blocking progress in the peace process, such as the release of prisoners, Israeli military operations in Gaza as well as in West Bank and settlement expansion throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. So Mr Sarry He indicated that the peace process started at the Annapolis can only be sustained by achieving real changes in the lives of the people in Gaza and in the West Bank. Finally, he called for a different and positive strategy for Gaza.  

Response by South African Delegation:

So in reaction to this, South Africa’s intervention by Ambassador Kumalo basically emphasised the need to end the occupation as sort of the key element of any resolution of the conflict situation in the Middle East.

We also noted in our intervention that there is clearly a gap between what is happening at the political level and the reality in the ground. The situation is obviously embarrassing for the Council and has a direct negative impact, we feel, on the credibility of the Council – the fact that the Council is unable to intervene while the situation continues to deteriorate.

Our view is that the people of Palestine have lost hope and trust on the UN, particularly the Security Council. And one of the things we have said through Ambassador Kumalo’s statement in the Council was that perhaps the Security
Council itself should consider visiting the region so that they can be able to observe for themselves the situation as it obtains today. As you know the Security Council has the ability to pay visits to different countries and different regions, especially those that are within its agenda, and we always think that these visits are helpful in appraising the Security Council itself directly of the situation.

The other issue that continues to be of concern to South Africa, which we continue to make in the Security Council is around the role of the UN in the Quartet.

As you know, we would prefer that there was a broader consultation with all the UN member states before the UN Secretary General participates in the meetings of the Quartet because he participates there presumably representing the UN. So we feel that there should be an opportunity for him to therefore get informed by the views of the members of the UN before his involvement in the meetings of the Quartet, and also we feel as South Africa that there should be feed back after the meetings of the Quartet where the UN is represented, therefore there should be feedback given to all the member states because as I said the Secretary General represents the UN in the Quartet.

So those are basically the only two things that were going to add to the briefing which Ambassador Minty was going to do, which was going to be specifically focused on Iran.

Questions and Answers

Question: I would like you to repeat yourself when it comes to the two meetings before we take over the UN Peace and Security seat. This meeting that we are talking about, is going to be in New York and is going to involve both the AU and the UN Security Council?

Answer: Yes

Question: And we don’t know yet what is our objective of holding this meeting, what are we trying to achieve? Can you please repeat that, maybe I am not getting it?

Answer:  Thank you. We have explained. Basically from the beginning, from last year when South Africa assumed the membership of the Security Council, the theme that we identified which we wanted to focus on as a matter of priority was the idea of bringing together in enhancing the cooperation between the UN and the AU. So that was basically the theme and it is the theme that we are following through this year.  So what happened last year was that through our Presidency, which was in March 2007, we had called for a report by the UN Secretary General with proposals on how this relationship can be enhanced. So that report is now being finalised and therefore it will be discussed during our Presidency in April 2008. So therefore these meetings will be informed by that overall framework and on the 17th our hope is that the outcome will be a resolution of the Security Council taking on board some of those concrete ideas about how the relationship between the AU and the UN can be enhanced.  So it is a theme that we identified from last year that it was going to be a theme that we will be pursuing through our membership of the Security Council for the two years. Then we use our Presidency like we used it in March 2007 – our next Presidency in April 2008, we will therefore use it to advance and hopefully deliver some concrete results on this process.  So that is what will be happening on the 17th. On the 16th in terms of the meeting, the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council met in Addis Ababa in June last year and in that meeting they agreed that they would meet annually, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York, so we then decided that this meeting this year should be held under our Presidency in New York in April. And I mean between the two Councils as you know the agenda overlaps so there are a number of African conflict situations that are on the agenda of both the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, therefore there is a lot that can be achieved with the two Councils meeting regularly and interacting on some of those areas.

Question: Inaudible

Answer:  The deployment of the Hybrid Force. At the moment I think we are still all concerned, it is still moving slowly. As you know there were quiet a number of pledges of troops for deployment in Darfur but most of those troops that have been pledged have not yet been deployed on the ground, so we are monitoring that situation.  At the moment what has happened is that the current force levels that the Unamid – that is the hybrid operation – has, are almost the same size as what Amis was, that is the African mission in Darfur. So it is almost the same number in the sense that there was a re-hatting of the African troops, the African mission into a UN mission so they have now become blue helmets. But slowly and gradually we hope that there will be more deployments based on the pledges that have been given. I mean we would like as South Africa, like other countries, to see the deployment of Unamid as soon as possible so that it could have the capacities that are needed.  One of the critical capabilities that is needed for Unamid, as you know, is helicopters because of the terrain in Darfur; the size of Darfur, there is a sense that a peace-keeping mission of that size can only be effective if it also have the capabilities in terms of the helicopters, but that is still lacking at the moment.  So South Africa, we have said it before that we urge countries that have these capabilities to provide them so that they become part of Unamid so that the force’s capacity can be improved and we are also of course urging countries that have pledged troops to continue deploying these troops until the force meets its full capacity.  And then of course there were some discussions; the reports that we get from the UN department of peace-keeping operations is that they are also mentioning progress because there were quiet a number of other issues, areas that were still unresolved between the UN and the government of Sudan. The indications that we have is that they are trying to make progress in those areas as well so that, as I say, Unamid can be able to stand with full capabilities.

Question: The Sudanese President said that African troops should come now, whether or not they are properly equipped. I don’t know if it is one of the issues the UN department of peace-keeping operations has raised. What is our view on that is that even when the troops are not properly equipped they should start deploying? Because in the words of … I don’t remember the official’s name, the  people of Darfur need to know that they are being protected and  Are we still confident that those levels, very high numbers of African troops will be deployed? If they will be produced?

Answer:  I would think that what the President of Sudan was saying was really just to emphasise the urgency of the deployment, which is a sentiment that we all share – I mean it is urgent, its important that this deployment must take place as soon as possible. Now in terms of the commitment of African troops or countries to deploy troops, we don’t have doubts on that, I mean a number of African countries are basically amongst the traditional contributors to UN peace-keeping missions, not just in Darfur but all over, I mean you have got over 50 000 UN peace-keeping troops deployed in various parts of Africa at the moment. A large part of those troops are African troops, so African countries have traditionally been able to provide troops for UN peace-keeping missions. So we want to believe that this will happen.  But I think just for some perspective of course we know that every UN peace-keeping mission usually takes at least up to six months before it is fully deployed, and as you know Unamid only took over from the African mission in the beginning of January. So I am not saying that we want to wait for six months, we would want Unamid to be fully deployed like tomorrow or yesterday, but I am just saying for perspective it is important for you to understand that sometimes these deployments can take up to a period of six months before they are fully deployed.

Question: Do you know why the helicopters are not forthcoming? There has been some suggestion that there is a world-wide shortage of military helicopters, and with deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq and wherever, and other peace-keeping operations. Is it some lack of political will by the western countries?

Answer:  I wouldn’t know exactly why some of the western countries have not provided, as I said we keep urging countries that have this capacity to provide them. But I mean it is true that quiet a number of engagements where countries are involved. There are other UN peace-keeping missions in Africa that require and that have helicopters as part of their logistic package and I think there are other engagements as well, as you indicated, outside the continent. But would not be able to say for sure why each individual country has not been able to.  At a political level our understanding is that the issue of Darfur is really an issue that has drawn and attracted the attention of the international community so I would think it would be difficult for any country, even it is a European country or a country from another region, to simply not have the political will because I think there is quiet a big attention that has been drawn to the situation in Darfur. But I mean we keep urging countries to provide this capacity.

Issued by Department of Foreign Affairs
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28 February 2008